We analyze the effect of a fundamental structural technological change in the telecommunication industry on telecom operators. The technological change pushed operators away from basic analog voice transmission to complex digital data transmission technology. We show that this recent change confronts operators with an enormous challenge because technologies for digital data are notorious for their complex patent landscape characterized by standard essential patents, patent thickets, litigation, and cross-licensing. We show that operators have fundamentally changed their patenting behavior, increasing filings on technologies for digital data almost fourfold over the past decade. Our results indicate that operators were most likely to patent in technologies most severely affected by the complexities of the patent landscape. While operators were so far on the sidelines on the global patent wars, our results suggest that they might soon see themselves embroiled in patent related disputes.
Introduction
How do innovative industries move from an equilibrium in which patents play no or only a minor role to an equilibrium in which patents are a crucial element that determines a company's ability to compete in the product market? Boldrin and Levin (2013) for example suggest that as industries mature, incumbents switch to using and enforcing patents to protect their market shares by extracting rents from (potential) entrants. Hall and Ziedonis (2001) document the onset of the so-called 'Patent Portfolio Races' in the semiconductor industry during the 1990s. The dramatic increase in patent filings within the industry reflected an increased perception of the strategic value of patent rights. This shift was remarkable because the semiconductor industry had largely operated without recourse to patent protection until then (Cohen et al., 2000) . Jell and Henkel (2014) document a similar sharp increase in strategic patenting in the German newspaper printing machine industry after the year 2000. The shift in patenting behavior was triggered by a single company's move towards more aggressive patenting, similar to the U.S. semiconductor industry where a single firm (Texas Instruments) is credited with triggering the patent portfolio races.
In this paper, we provide empirical evidence for a different channel through which an industry can move from an equilibrium in which patents play no or only a minor role to an equilibrium where strategic patenting is a crucial element in firms' ability to compete in the market: technological change. We look at telecommunication operators for which historically patents have played no or only a minor role. We show how the fundamental technological change from analog voice transmission to digital data transmission technology has been pushing telecom operators into patent races.
Digitization has fundamentally transformed the information and communication technology (ICT) industry more broadly. The technological change has been accompanied by a dramatic increase in the use of patents and escalating patent enforcement which have resulted in outright 'Patent Wars' (Financial Times, October 17, 2011) . Several interrelated factors explain this shift towards patenting in ICT: First, there has been a global patent explosion (Kortum and Lerner, 1999; Fink et al., 2013) , perhaps most notably in China (Eberhardt et al., 2011) . According to WIPO data, the combined share of the top 5 ICT fields on the total number of patents filed worldwide went from 18.8% in 1995, to 28.9% in 2013. 1 Second, there is an overall increase in the level of technological complexity and the convergence of different technological domains. The increased complexity and combination of different types of technologies result in a high degree of interdependency between different components of a given technology. This complexity has led to overlapping claims across patents which can result in patent thickets if patent ownership is diffuse (Shapiro, 2001) . The more complex technologies are, the more prevalent are such thickets (von . Third, the need for interoperability and interconnectivity of different technologies and devices to combine them into single products and services creates demand for technological standards that promote compatibility. While such standards, in principle, allow to link different products and technologies by different producers, such standards also involve patent rights, providing additional incentives to patent strategically and define standards accordingly. Similarly, firms seek to establish alternative mechanisms to structure the patent jungle. Patent pools and cross-licensing agreements are popular solutions, but they have the obvious drawback that in order to participate, firms need patents.
The whole array of these complex issues -the fast increase in the size of companies' patent portfolios, technological complexity and interdependencies, patent thickets, standard relevant patents, patent pools and cross-licensing agreements, IP litigation, and trolling non-practicing entities (NPEs) -has affected perhaps most prominently the market for smartphones and tablet computers. Telecommunication operators have been largely spared so far. However, there are signs that this might change soon.
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Telecom operators' revenues from their traditional core services have started to dry up; standard business models based on revenue streams from traditional voice telephony and SMS have given way to alternative, internet-based services largely circumventing operators. While operators have been forced to compete through lower prices and more bandwidth for a given price, they saw other companies take advantage of their infrastructure to offer new digital products and services including smartphones, social networks, cloud services, online gaming, online financial transactions, online advertising, and many forms of e-commerce.
Hence the combination of a faltering traditional business model, a universally shifting paradigm towards digital content, and the need to regain weight in an environment dominated by new players in the industry, has lead telecom operators to enter the playing field so far occupied by Apple, Microsoft, Google, Facebook, etc. This move is carried out on the back of large amounts of financial resources and the infrastructure built over the past decades. Probably the most visible recent move into this direction is provided by the Spanish Telefónica group which underwent profound restructuring in 2011 involving the creation of a new business unit: Telefónica Digital (El Pais 05 September 2011). The new business unit of Telefónica focuses specifically on steering Telefónica's global business towards the creation and marketing of digital services including internet services, cloud computing, videos, e-financial services, mobile advertising, and M2M (machine-to-machine) services. As part of this restructuring, Telefónica created an internal 'R&D Patent Office' to ensure the group creates a patent portfolio by moving from an environment in which patents played no or a minor role to one where patents are seen as an integral part of Telefónica's new business model. The example of Telefónica's restructuring offers a compelling illustration of the strategic re-positioning of operators by moving into digital markets and the resulting perceived need for strategic patent portfolios.
In this paper, we use a panel European telecom operators to document the major technological shift that has occurred in the telecommunication operator industry. 2 The European Patent EP1186189 (priority date 08.03.1999 ) illustrates what we might expect in the near future. This patent, entitled 'Method of allocating access rights to a telecommunications channel to subscriber stations of a telecommunications network and subscriber station,' was originally owned by the German manufacturer Bosch. However, IPcom, a NPE, acquired the patent from Bosch and uses it to sue HTC (a smartphone producer). In addition, IPcom also goes after telephone operators: British Vodafone and German T-mobile.
3 The current draft is based on a sample of 10 European telecom operators during the period
We show that operators have recently started to move into technologies related to digital data transmission. We also show that these technologies have been most directly affected by the increase in strategic patenting and the accompanying problems such as thickets as well as the move towards litigation. 4 Our analysis shows that telecom operators increase their patenting activity most heavily in these technologies -despite the substantial potential for conflict and costs involved in strategic patenting. This offers evidence on how technological change in form of technological convergence and a corresponding increase in complexity can push an industry into patent races.
The remainder is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the telecom industry and the technological change it has undergone over the past two decades. Section 3 describes the data used in our analysis and Section 4 discusses our empirical approach and shows our results. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks.
The telecommunication industry

Background
In recent years, the telecommunication industry has been undergoing a radical transformation accompanied by the evolution from a supply oriented industry offering basic fixed line services to a demand oriented industry that offers mobile telecommunication services, and integrates IT and media services (Anderson and Mollyerd, 1997) . In particular, the move towards Internet Protocol (IP) based services has substantially changed the telecommunication landscape and enriched the service portfolio of mobile telecommunication providers (Li and Whalley, 2002) . Through new services, such as Voice over IP (VoIP), IP telephony, video portals, social communities or mobile payment systems operators are able to expand their customer base from selling services not only to subscribers (who pay for use of infrastructure) to potentially everyone that is connected to the internet.
According to the European Telecommunications Network Operators Association (ETNO), the total number of mobile subscribers in Europe has grown from approximately 597 million in 2006 to 763 million in 2011.
5 Similarly, the mobile subscriber penetration rate increased by 25.5 percentage points over the period, exceeding 127 percent (127 mobile subscribers over 100 inhabitants) averaged across European countries in 2011. The fixed line subscriber base in contrast dropped from 261 million in 2006 to 207 million in 2011 as more and more subscribers switched to VoIP using their broadband lines or mobile devices. In 2011, 61 million subscribers used VoIP-based services not taking into account those customers using over-the-top (OTT) solutions such as Sykpe, Facebook or Google Talk (ETNO, 2012) . Figure  1 presents the development of the number of subscribers fixed, mobile and VoIP services. 2000-2007; however, the final draft will cover 24 operators for 14 years.
4 EPO patent filings in ICT have more than tripled between 1995 and 2013. While patent filings in traditional telecom classes have doubled, patent filings in Internet related telecom have increased fivefold. Authors' elaboration from Patstat.
5 Including Turkey, excluding Russia, Ukraine and Georgia. Another development that has influenced the telecommunication business is the convergence of telecommunication technologies with internet technologies that have followed two separate trajectories until the mid 1980s. The first refers to the digitization of the telecommunication network starting in the early 1970s that enabled digital data transmission (Davies, 1991) . The digital transmission and the related ISD standards enabled digital switching and supported digital air interfaces in mobile telecommunication systems. The other development refers to the internet which is based on the TCP/IP protocol that standardizes the rules of packaging, transmitting and receiving data over the internet. Whereas the traditional telecommunication technologies are based on circuit-switching, the internet-related technologies are based on packet-switching that provide higher flexibility and lower costs (Bohlin et al., 2000) .
However, the increased importance of the internet for telecommunication means that applications and services related to mobile telecommunication have to be compatible with the TCP/IP protocol. This is evident in a range of standardization efforts around core data transmission technologies. For example, the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) decided in early 1998 to adopt a new standard for so-called third generation mobile services, referred to as universal mobile telephone system (UMTS). The rising popularity of internet-based applications that rely on the infrastructure of telecommunication operators is evident in the increasing demand for data services. In the European Union (EU), the broadband penetration for mobile subscribers rose from 13 percent in 2008 to 54 percent in 2013. Particularly in Nordic Countries (i.e. Denmark, Sweden and Finland), the mobile broadband penetration, averaged across handheld devices and computer users, reached already 100 percent in 2013 (EC, 2013) . Cisco Systems estimates that the total data volume in mobile networks will grow at a compounded annual growth rate of 66 percent from 520 petabytes per month at the end of 2011 to 11.2 exabytes per month in 2017 (Cisco, 2013) .
Structural changes
Traditionally, the relatively stable environment that characterized the telecommunication industry over a long period consisted of three main technology layers. The equipment layer provides essential network elements, transmission and switch systems; the network layer provides infrastructure to connect sender and recipient; content and services were located in the third layer (Fransman, 2001; Li and Whalley, 2002) . The network and the equipment layer were connected by air-interface standards such as GSM (Global System for Mobile Communication) and CDMA (Code Division Multiple Access) (Peppard and Rylander, 2006) . Through their monopoly position before deregulation in the 1990s, telecommunication incumbents controlled the entire value chain across layers (Steinbock, 2003) .
However, the rapid technological developments that have been driving the abovementioned convergence have added complexity. Fransman (2001) argues that due to the telecommunication industry's increased complexity, it is now better characterized by the interplay of six different layers ranging from equipment and software, network, navigation and middleware, applications including content as well as customers. This increased complexity and interdependence has lead a number of scholars to describe the evolution of the telecommunication industry as a shift from a value chain to a value network (Li and Whalley, 2002; Olla and Patel, 2002; Steinbock, 2003; Peppard and Rylander, 2006; Tilson and Lyytinen, 2006; Funk, 2009 ). This has several implications for the mobile telecommunication industry.
First, the reduction of barriers to entry has drawn new players from other industries into the market and given them direct access to customers. Today, content and services are likely to be developed and managed by highly specialized companies with latest technologies that support most advanced services (Peppard and Rylander, 2006) . However, telecommunication operators do not control these newly created revenue streams and there is an ongoing debate about the provision of thirdparty applications using the infrastructure owned by operators (FT, 2012) .
Second, the convergence of telecommunication with internet-based technologies has given rise to new areas of competition in the "datacom space" related to data and voice services over IP based networks (Seaberg et al., 1997) . Coupled with higher-capacity wireless networks, in particular those followed by the evolution from UMTS to LTE (Long Term Evolution), and an almost complete mobile broadband coverage, 6 this has given large internet companies the opportunity to enter the market. Today, companies such as Yahoo, Microsoft, Facebook or Twitter are playing a dominant role in the telecommunication industry. While these new markets are characterized by aggressive competition (Fertig et al., 1999; Birch and Burnett-Kant, 2001; Li and Whalley, 2002) , telecommunication incumbents are forced to invest billions in spectrum license auctions 7 and the maintenance of extensive proprietary infrastructures 8 to maintain their key position in the corresponding mobile delivery channels. On the other hand, the fast growth of IP-based services allowed entrants to challenge the dominant position of operators. Internet companies have also been relying extensively on acquisitions (Chan-Olmsted and Jamison, 2001; Waverman and Trillas, 2002; Pennings et al., 2005) to offer the latest technologies and a broad range of technological alternatives to customers. A case in point is Microsoft's acquisition of Skype in October 2011 for around USD 8.5 billion, representing Microsoft's largest acquisition to date.
9 At the time Skype had a relatively large user base of some 170 million customers and invested heavily in the acquisition of the intellectual property enhancing its peer-to-peer (P2P) network (Microsoft, 2011) . The competitive advantage of companies such as Skype lies in their ability to provide services and applications on handheld mobile devices that had already reached market acceptance on the computer. As some of these services have become financially more lucrative than traditional telecommunication services like text messaging or voice telephony, they have become serious competition for operators. Declining stock prices, persistent high levels of debt (Isern and Rios, 2002) , profit warnings (FT, 2012) and negative price trends 10 are only some indicators that illustrate how telecommunication operators are struggling with the consequences of the fast changing environment, in particular the shift away from traditional voice and text messaging towards the provision of digital data services.
To illustrate this, Figure 2 shows the long-term drop in traditional voice and text messaging operations for the Spanish mobile telecommunication industry. 8 Investments in mobile networks represented 45.5 percent of the total capital expenditure in Europe in 2011 or EUR 20.7 billion, a 5.6 percent increase compared to 2010 as network operators need more and more capacity to meet customer demand for mobile data, investing in 3G and first 4G networks (ETNO, 2012) .
9 Skype was founded in 2003. The former European-based startup was acquired by eBay for approximately USD 2.5 billion in September 2005 and then acquired by an investment group led by Silver Lake in November 2009 (Microsoft, 2011) .
10 In the EU-27 countries, the average price for a mobile minute dropped from 16.3 cent in 2003 to 13.8 cent in 2008 (Péladeau et al., 2010) .
11 We chose the Spanish the telecommunication industry because the Spanish national regulatory authority CMT (Comisión del Mercado de las Telecomunicaciones) offers rich data on the Spanish market. The data contain not only information about number of subscribers, minutes of traffic, and revenues, but also distinguishes between pre-pay and post-pay clients, and on-net and off-net traffic. Moreover, it contains data about revenues obtained from fixed monthly subscription fees (CMT, 2012) . (Kongaut and Bohlin, 2012) .
12 In contrast, mobile data and internet revenues show an upward sloping trend over time and are gaining importance in relative terms: in 2009, data revenue was about 11.5 percent of mobile service revenues and surpassed text messaging revenues, accounting for 9.7 percent. In 2011, the provision of data and internet related services reached almost 20 percent. This clearly suggests that structural changes rather than cyclical factors are quickly transforming the industry.
Operators' strategic choices
To avoid "degenerating into a bit pipe,"
13 mobile operators decided to revise their corporate strategies and re-position themselves in the market place to compensate for dwindling revenue from the traditional telecommunication business. Operators have recently begun to emulate big internet companies such as Google or Yahoo and to differentiate their offer towards "converged" products and services.
Mobile operators have approached the strategic challenge in multiple ways. As mentioned above, perhaps the most drastic and clear-cut example for the strate- According to Telefónica, the unit is expected to create annual revenues of approximately EUR 5 billion by 2015 with an annual revenue growth rate of 20 percent across eight key sectors: financial services, M2M, advertising, eHealth, video & media, security, cloud service and applications (Telefónica, 2012 Kranenburg and Hagedoorn (2008) show that these companies have entered new technologies not only through the creation of new subsidiaries or business units as in the case of Telefónica Digital, but also through strategic alliances and joint ventures. Pennings et al. (2005) confirm the increased importance of inter-firm partnerships for operators in entering digital technologies. The authors show that since the beginning of the 1990s operators have increasingly sought alliances with firms outside the telecommunications industry. This pattern is easily explained by their need to gain access to new and complementary capabilities and resources and to integrate them with their traditional business model. For example, Telefónica Digital recently signed a partnership with Visa Europe to develop new products and services in areas such as mobile wallet or contactless payments. Telefónica Digital has also acquired an equity stake in the music streaming provider Rhapsody International and a strategic alliance with Masternaut involved in telematics solutions.
Apart from internal restructuring, alliances, and M&A, mobile operators have also recognized the importance of patents for digital data technologies. Hall and Ziedonis (2001) showed that patent filings took off in the U.S. semiconductor industry at the end of the 1980s and that this is explained by an increase in companies' patenting propensity for strategic reasons rather than increased innovative activity. Patenting propensities in ICT displayed even more pronounced an increase during the same period. The patents-R&D ratio (patents per 1992 US$ million) increased from around .4 in 1987 to .9 in 2000 -for comparison, the increase in semiconductors was from .3 to .6 over the same period (updated Figure 1 of Hall and Ziedonis (2001) ). More recent data by Fink et al. (2013) , who cover 13 OECD economies, show that patenting propensities in ICT continued to climb during the 2000s. Fink et al. (2013) also show that the relative increase in patent filings in ICT is in fact partly due to extremely fast growth in filings on digital communication technologies -filings increased in absolute terms by almost 15 percent per year between 1995-2008, outstripping by far the R&D growth rate in that sector. Our analysis focus on this aspect of changes in operators' behavior following the structural technological change that the industry has undergone in the past two decades.
Data
The data used in this study come from four main sources. First, we collected quarterly information on the mobile telecommunication industry in 15 Western European economies from the Business Monitor International Telecommunication Reports. 14 These reports cover general and operator specific market data, operator profiles, company histories, financial information, as well as telecommunication network and service information. Apart from providing detailed data on the telecommunication industry, the reports also allowed us to identify the complex ownership structure of the European mobile telecommunication companies. The second data component provides additional information on companies' ownership structure, in form of ownership links provided by Bureau Van Dijk's (BVD) Amadeus database for the period between 2000 and 2008, and M&A data from SDC Platinum and Zephyr. The ownership data identifies business groups, while M&A data allows us not only to attribute changes in business groups over the period between 2000 and 2008 but also helps us reconstruct ownership links to affiliates that have dissolved prior to 2000, and fully integrated into the parent company. Third, our source of patent data is the EPO Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (edition April 2012). Fourth, firms' financial data were extracted from OSIRIS provided by BVD.
We combined the different datasets in the following way. We started by identifying the ultimate owners of all European telecommunication companies. Among the set of owners, we selected only those that are themselves telecommunication operators and that make more than half of their revenue from operations in Europe, using the Business International Telecommunication Reports and the operators' annual reports. We then traced each operator's history to identify possible name changes and restructuring. In sum, we identified a total of 10 telecommunication operators that are of potential interest for our study.
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We are in the process of gathering information for an enlarged set of 24 European operators.
Next, we retrieved all wholly owned active subsidiaries of these 10 parent firms between 2000 and 2008 from Amadeus. We then matched these firms to the SDC M&A and Zephyr databases to determine whether any of these affiliates have been directly acquired by the parent company or its subsidiaries between 2000 and 2008. Finally, we identified companies that have been directly acquired by a sample firm or by one of the affiliates of a sample firm prior to 2000 that did not exist as a separate company between 2000 and 2008. We are in the process of extending the dataset till the year 2014.
In a last step, we matched all of the company names to the patent data. For matching, we standardized assignee and company names and relied on string matching.
16 After some manual checks and corrections, we matched 42,672 patent applications to 127 patent holders (i.e. assignees). Of all identified patent applications, 61 percent are filed under the name of the parent company, 11 percent under the name of one of the affiliates of our sample firms, and 28 percent are incoming patent application via a merger or an acquisition.
In order to identify telecommunication related patents, we used the concordance table provided by Palmberg and Martikainen (2006) . Based on the IPC classes, the authors link four-digit technology classes into technology categories. Table 1 distinguishes between the traditional telecommunication technologies, internet related telecommunication technologies and several other relevant areas related to next generation applications and network technologies.
Analysis
In this section, we first describe a few stylized facts about changes in patenting behavior by telecom operators. Next, we analyze factors that have influenced the 15 Operators included are Deutsche Telekom (Germany), Elisa (Finland), Orange (France), KPN (Netherlands), Telecom Italia (Italy), Telefónica (Spain), Telenor (Norway), TeliaSonera (Sweden), Swisscom (Switzerland), and Vodafone (UK).
16 Compared to approximate string matching (ASM), the advantage of this conservative method lies in a high level of precision at cost of some loss of completeness. As a first step, company and assignee names were standardized following the steps proposed by Magerman et al. (2006) . The main standardization procedures involved in this study cover the following categories: character cleaning; punctuation cleaning (pre-parsing); legal form indication treatment; spelling variation standardization; condensing; umlaut standardization. In a second step, we matched the sample firms with the list of the harmonized patent assignee names. Figure 4 shows the evolution of the patent stocks of the mobile telecommunication operators between 2000 and 2008, respectively. The operator patent stocks increase at a relatively constant rate since 2000. When we look at the distribution of patenting activities across technological fields, we can clearly see a shift towards digital technologies. Filings related to "Data and internet related applications" which are internet-related telecommunication technologies have grown fastest, followed by "Wireless Communication Networks." Traditional telecommunication technologies such as "Transmission", "Switching", and "Voice application and equipment" have also grown over time but at much slower rate. This shows that internet-related communication technologies have become more important than traditional telecommunication technologies. In fact, patent applications in traditional telecommunication technologies have remained relatively stable accounting for around 28 percent of our operators' entire patent portfolio over the sample period between 2000 and 2008. On the other hand, the share of internet-related telecommunication technologies increased significantly from 17 percent to 32 percent representing now the largest technological category. Another interesting observation is the relatively low number of patent applications In order to measure the concentration of patenting across technologies, we compute the Herdindahl index.
Changes in patenting activity
17 We find that the Herfindahl index increased from 0.08 to 0.14 (a 75 percent increase). There was a substantial increase in the concentration of patenting activities around a few technology classes between 2000 and 2008. Looking at the distribution of patents across technologies in Figure 5 , the increase in concentration is driven by an increased focus on technologies related to digital data transmission.
On closer inspection of the four-digit IPC classes that are underlying the technological field "Data and internet applications," we see significant differences between the three classes G06F, H04L and G06N. Most noteworthy is the dramatic increase in patent applications in class H04L ('transmission of digital information'): Out of 9,237 new patent applications in "Data and internet applications," subclass H04L contributes 81 percent to that increase. As a consequence, patent applications in H04L represent 26 percent of total patent applications in 2008. The increased importance of H04L applies across all operators. H04L contains technologies for the transmission of digital information. A core application of this technology is the Internet. Thus, the significant increase of patent filings in this technological field shows the increased importance of convergent technologies and demonstrates the move of operators towards new technological domains related to digital data. Since increased technological complexity and convergence may require the combination of different technologies, more patents might include the H04L class in addition to a number of other technologies. To investigate this, Figure 6 shows the share of patents with one, two, and three IPC subclasses per patent application for all firms that have patents in class H04L. The figure shows that the share of patents with only one subclass has increased substantially over time and accounts for almost 60 percent in 2008. This means that companies are genuinely shifting towards technologies directly related to digital data transmission instead of broadening existing technologies to also cover digital data transmission technologies.
What explains technology choices?
The previous section has shown a large increase in absolute and relative terms of patents on digital data transmission held by telecom operators. In this section we show that operators have been forced to increase their patent holdings in this technology area despite of -or precisely because of -the complex patent landscape that characterizes digital technologies. In fact, we show that counter-intuitively operators have increased their patent holdings especially in technologies that hold large poten-tial for conflict and costly litigation. This points toward patent portfolios reflecting a strategic need in technologies characterized by a complex patent landscape.
The existing literature has identified a number of sources of conflict that have been found mostly in digital data transmission technologies:
• Standard essential patents (SEPs): Although technology standards are pervasive across industries (Baron et al., 2013) , patenting of standard related technologies has been most prevalent in ICT. Standard essential patents are of particular value to companies because infringement can be inferred from the use of the standard.
18 Although there are obvious benefits to technology standards (above all compatibility and interoperability), the role of SEPs has been more controversial. For example, Blind et al. (2011) offer survey evidence that shows that participants of standard setting organizations consider SEPs to make it harder to reach consensus and slow the standardization process. Companies that do not own SEPs indicated that they encounter problems negotiating licensing conditions. Kang and Bekkers (2013) argue that SEPs are often the outcome of strategic insertion of patents into the standard despite little technological value of these patents to the standard. Perhaps more importantly, SEPs can create market power that goes beyond the patent but that derives from the standard.
19 Even (F)RAND licensing obligations often do not solve the issue as frequently disputes about the actual (F)RAND royalty rate erupt. Moreover, royalty stacking might also occur if ownership of SEPs on a given standard is split across multiple patent owners. To measure the existence of SEPs across technologies, we use the number of SEPs by IPC subclass.
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• Patent thickets: Patent thickets arise when different patent owners hold patents with overlapping claims (Shapiro, 2001) . Such overlaps can create problems as companies may block each other's use of the technology protected by the overlapping set of patent claims. The more complex technologies are (in the sense defined by Cohen et al. (2000) ), the more prevalent are such thickets (von . Patent thickets are associated with increased transaction costs for companies. For example, Cockburn and MacGarvie (2011) show for the software market that patent density (which can be regarded as a proxy for thickets) within narrowly defined markets is associated with less product market entry. They also find that entry depends on the size of a company's own patent portfolio -companies with larger patent portfolios pre-entry are more likely to eventually enter the market. Hall et al. (2013) 18 According to ETSI (2011: 6) , "essential" means that it is not possible on technical (but not commercial) grounds, taking into account normal technical practice and the state of the art generally available at the time of standardization, to make, sell, lease, otherwise dispose of, repair, use or operate equipment or methods which comply with a standard without infringing that IPR.
19 As explained by Richard Posner in his judgment in Apple vs. Motorola, "The purpose of the FRAND requirements [...] is to confine the patentees' royalty demand to the value conferred by the patent itself as distinct from the additional value -the hold-up value -conferred by the patent's being designated as standard-essential." (Judge Posner, 2012: 18) . 20 We obtained the data from Baron et al. (2013) , who collect the data from almost 6,300 different ICT standards.
come to similar conclusions, although they look at entry at the technology level. They find a negative association between entry into technologies and thickets density. These studies show that markets and technologies characterized by patent thickets generate transaction costs for companies that make entry more difficult. To capture the prevalence of patent thickets, we use the 'triple counts' measure developed by von at the IPC subclass level.
• NPEs: NPEs usually acquire patents with the intention to monetize them, often under the threat of litigation or directly through litigation. In most cases, they do not engage in innovative activity or sell products in the product market (Hagiu and Yoffie, 2013) . NPEs pose particular challenges to producing companies. They are difficult if not impossible to counter-sue precisely because they do not undertake any productive activity. They also often ambush companies by initiating legal action when an injunction would be particularly costly to the producing firm (exploiting hold-up). Bessen and Meurer (2014) present survey data that suggests that larger companies spend on average around US$1.5 million in legal expenses on a law suit against a NPE and more than US$7 million in licensing fees. There has been an astronomic rise in lawsuits brought by NPEs in the U.S. -the number of cases jumped from 144 in 2001 to 3,134 in 2013 involving 3,716 producing companies. 21 Using U.S. data for 2000-2007, Allison et al. (2010) show that software and telecommunications patents are generally litigated more often than patents in other technology fields and especially so by NPEs. We take the presence of NPEs by IPC subclass into account by constructing a measure of NPE presence. We identified patent holding companies and large patent aggregators based on patent holder litigant data provided by Cotropia et al. (2012) . 22 We extended these data and checked for name variations by using additional information on NPE assertions from other sources, such as RPX and Patent Freedom. We then matched these NPE names with patent data.
• Litigation: Litigation is often the end point of a patent dispute. It is wellknown that only a tiny fraction of patent disputes ends in court (Greenhalgh et al., 2010) as court cases engender often very substantial legal expenses and expose a business to enormous uncertainty. Despite this, there has been a recent strong increase in patent litigation specifically on information and communication technologies. To measure the risk of litigation for patents by IPC subclass, we obtained data on patent litigation from Cremers et al. (2013) . The data covers all patent cases in Germany, the UK, France, and the Netherlands over the period 2000-2008. 23 We allocated patent cases to IPC subclasses based on the patents involved in a lawsuit and created litigation case counts by IPC subclass and year (where year means the year a law suit 21 See patentfreedom. 22 We manually cleaned the data to eliminate large patent aggregators that are part of a producing entity.
23 Since our focus is on European telecom operators, data on litigation in Europe is preferable over U.S. litigation data.
was initiated).
• Licensing: Firms that are active in technology fields that are characterized by SEPs, patent thickets, and litigation often resort to licensing to resolve costly (legal) disputes and the possibility of injunctions. Siebert and von Graevenitz (2011) show for the semi-conductor industry that licensing can help resolve disputes in the presence of patent thickets. But their evidence also indicates that the more fragmented patent rights are, the lower likelihood of licensing. Cockburn et al. (2010) also suggest that firms facing patent thickets have a higher propensity to engage in in-licensing, which supports the view that licensing can mitigate the defragmentation of rights. Hence, technology fields in which technology transactions in the form of licensing take place might be able to mitigate at least to some extent the problems mentioned above. We extracted licensing data from SDC Platinum and ktMINE and matched the data to BvD's Amadeus database to allocate licenses to NAICS industry classes. We used an IPC-NAICS correspondence table provided by Lybbert and Zolas (2013) to transform license counts by industry into license counts by IPC subclass. Figure 7 shows the combination of SEPs, patents held by NPEs, and thickets density by IPC subclass. The figure shows that a few IPC subclasses stand out. Subclass H04L is in the top right corner, which means it scores high in terms of SEPs, NPE patents, and the size of the bubble shows that patent thickets are most prevalent within this subclass. As shown above, it is precisely subclass H04L where operators have increased their patent holdings the most. This is noteworthy because as Figure 7 demonstrates, this is the subclass that clearly stands out in terms of characteristics that are known to be highly problematic. The figure also suggests that a number of other subclasses H04B (transmission), H04W (wireless communication networks), H04M (telephonic communication), and H04N (pictorial communication) within class H04 (electric communication) are problematic.
24 Outside of H04, only subclass G06F (electrical digital data processing) stands out.
A closer look at the data underlying Figure 7 confirms that the operators in our sample do not contribute in any significant way to the density of SEPs or thickets, that is, they enter technology fields characterized by a strong presence of SEPs, thickets, and NPE activity. It is important to emphasize that operators moved into these digital technologies due to the exogenous technological change that has occurred in their industry (see Section 2.2 above). Hence, the increase in their patent holdings in related technologies (H04 and G06F) coincides with entry into these technologies rather than a simple change in patenting behavior. In other words, in order to enter digital technologies, operators were forced to engage in patenting in technology fields most heavily affected by the complex patent landscape outlined above. This point is made more formally by the regression results shown in Table  2 . The data for the regressions consists of 30,821 patent filings by our sample of operator companies over the period [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . The unit of observation is the IPC subclass-year where we include all IPC subclasses in which at least one patent was filed during our sample period (a total of 401 distinct subclasses). Our main interest is in the coefficients on the litigation, SEP, NPE, licensing and thickets measures. The specification also includes operator dummy variables (France Telecom (Orange) is the omitted category), a dummy for IPC subclass H04L and the log or total assets and R&D intensity of operators. The results are striking: there is a positive association between the number of patents filed within IPC subclasses and the different measures of the potential for conflict associated with the patent landscape. One would expect companies to avoid entering patent classes that are characterized by the problems discussed above. For example Hall et al. (2013) find that companies are less likely to file patents in classes characterized by high density of patent thickets. Our results suggest that the opposite holds for telecom operators. Note that the coefficient on the licensing variable is negative and statistically significant. This suggests that IPC subclasses characterized by more licensing activity see fewer filings by operators. This suggests that patent filings and licensing act as substitutes in this context. When we include the H04L dummy in column (III), we find a large, positive coefficient. This underscores the descriptive findings above. Table A in the Appendix. Each regression includes an intercept as well as year-fixed effects and operator dummies.
In Table 3 we split the sample period into before and after the mobile internet boom in 2005. The main focus is on the coefficients on the H04L dummy variable. The marginal effect doubles in the 2005-2008 period, indicating a strengthening of patenting efforts in this subclass. These results support the main proposition of our analysis: the exogeneous shift in telecommunication technology forced telecommunication operators to adapt their business towards digital technologies and hence pushed them towards patenting in technologies that are characterized by a complex patent landscape which is likely to confront operators with substantial challenges in the (near) future.
Mode of acquisition
A related question is how operators have amassed patents in digital technologies. More in general, companies can develop the technology internally and then patent it, buy patents through arms' length contracts, or acquire entities that hold relevant patent portfolios (Aurora et al., 2001 ).
25 Table 4 shows the results from a multinomial logit where we compare market-based sources of patents with in-house development. 26 We find the coefficients on the H04L dummy to be negative for modes 'subsidiary' and 'acquisition.' This means that patents in H04L and in fact in digital technologies more generally (including G06F) originate mostly directly from operators. This shows that operators have started patenting themselves in the critical technology classes (IPC subclasses H04 and G06), supporting the view that patenting strategies of telecom operators have changed. Operators are now heavily engaged in patenting in those technology classes most heavily affected by the various problems discussed in Section 4.1 above.
Conclusion
The telecom operator industry has been directly affected by a major technological change in ICT that was largely driven by outsiders, but which threatened to erode the traditional business model of telecom operators. Operators were sluggish to respond to this sweeping technological change and the resulting competitive challenges. One particular challenge was the heavy use of strategic patenting in digital data communication. This created a sudden need for operators to adapt their patenting strategies and to build patent portfolios on the new technologies. Therefore, the largely exogenously imposed technological change in the telecom business not only pushed operators to move into a new technological direction, but it also pushed the operator industry away from an equilibrium in which patents played only a minor role for firms' ability to compete in the market to an equilibrium in which patents are a necessary precondition for participation in the market. In fact, our analysis shows that operators move precisely into technology classes that have been most heavily affected by issues such as patent thickets, NPEs, and standard essential patents.
While largely descriptive in nature, our study offers at least three lessons. First, sectors might switch to aggressive patenting behavior as a result of exogenous technological change. Interestingly enough, in the case of telecommunication operators, technological change is not the outcome of innovation within the sector; instead, it has occurred because of technological convergence and blurring boundaries across sectors. This is an important consideration for scholars who investigate the relationship between industry dynamics and patenting. Second, we find an interesting result which contradicts the conventional wisdom in the patents and entry literature. We show that telecom operators enter precisely those technology classes that are characterized by a more complex patent landscape and hence higher transaction costs (including a higher risk of patent-related disputes). Finally, our research has practical implications for telecom operators. It is clearly too early to tell what the effect of the increased importance of patents on the industry is going to be. That said, in the short run, it is very likely to create substantial costs for operators, both in terms of obtaining patents as well as transaction costs involved in managing the complex patent landscape in digital data. As a result, the move towards digital technologies might see more legal patent experts employed by telecom operators, which reflects the strategic nature of their increased patenting activity. We leave an evaluation of the net social effect of such a change for future research. [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] ii
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